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THE GOVERNANCE PROBLEM IN 
AGGREGATE LITIGATION 
Samuel Issacharoff* 
 
Recent developments in class action law and scholarship have forced 
new attention on the question of how class representation should be 
assessed.  This Article begins with an examination of the governance 
problem in class action analyzed from the perspective of the customary 
political theories that would justify legitimate government in public and 
private domains.  Customary accounts of democratic legitimacy or 
contractual voluntarism poorly capture the distinct world of the one-time 
aggregation of a class under court-assigned leadership.  What emerges is 
an assessment of how various class action doctrines serve to fill the void in 
customary indications of legitimacy in governance.  The Article concludes 
with a review of alternative efforts to structure class governance to avoid 
the agency problems inherent in the power to manage the affairs of others. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Legal disputes over class actions operate at two distinct levels.  The 
immediate question before any court confronting an issue of class 
certification is relatively straightforward:  Should the class be certified or 
not?  In a contested certification for purposes of establishing liability, the 
 
*  Reiss Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University School of Law.  I am 
indebted to the research assistance of Rachel Goodwin, Maria Ponomarenko, and Samuel 
Zeitlin. 
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plaintiffs will be proponents, and the defendants will object for entirely 
comprehensible reasons of self-interest.  When class certification is sought 
following settlement, plaintiffs and defendants embrace the putative class 
action, and the objections arise from those outside the operative command 
of the case. 
Framed as a dispute over certification, class actions quickly descend into 
a ritualized review of the applicable factors under Rule 23.  Beginning at 
least with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Amchem Products, Inc. v. 
Windsor1 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,2 the adequacy of class 
representation became one of the most promising routes to challenge the 
appropriateness of class certification.  In contested class certification 
proceedings, representational adequacy became a focus of litigation, joining 
with the predominance question under Rule 23(b)(3) and, more recently in 
the aftermath of Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes,3 the existence of common 
issues under Rule 23(a)(2).  For both defendants seeking to resist the 
creation of a litigation class and for objectors challenging a proposed 
settlement, the question of the “structural assurance of fair and adequate 
representation,”4 as formulated in Amchem, became a central litigation 
issue.  And, in each setting, the objection to the stewardship of the class 
became grounds to attack the viability of the aggregate proceeding. 
Challenges to the adequacy of the representation are thus offered for 
strategic reasons in the certification context.  The case law offers a gambit 
for opposition, and lawyers, unsurprisingly, frame their litigation aims in 
the doctrinal language available.  Nonetheless, the strategic context should 
not obscure that assigning the right of representation to a binding class 
resolution of a dispute is a serious question, independent of whether a 
particular dispute should or should not proceed as a class.  Put another way, 
whether a dispute is proper for collective resolution is analytically distinct 
from the question of what safeguards should be in place to ensure proper 
representation.   
In order to disentangle the case specific strategic challenges from the 
underlying problem of leadership in representative actions, a return to a few 
basics is required.  A class action overcomes a host of collective action 
problems, ranging from the inadequacy of individual claimants’ resources 
to potential holdout problems and can secure a premium for complete 
settlement with a defendant.5  Across decades of case law, the gains from 
collective resolution of disputes are the defining feature of why there must 
be aggregative procedures in the litigation arsenal.  But the fact that an 
action has the attributes of an aggregated claim does not by itself ensure 
 
 1. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 2. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 3. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 4. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627. 
 5. See generally D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate 
Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2122877. 
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that it is properly led.  Clearly someone has to be in charge.  Who that 
someone, and by what measure of selection and accountability remain vital 
questions even after the need for collective resolution is established.  
Tactical decisions made in the litigation context should not collapse the two 
inquiries.  It is perfectly possible to endorse the need for collective 
proceedings in a variety of contexts, while full well realizing the agency 
problems of faithless representatives. 
This Article looks to pursue the distinct issue of how to overcome the 
agency problem in class representation.  Two advances in recent 
scholarship help frame this debate.  The first is the concept of a class as an 
“entity,” as formulated by David Shapiro, having a persona and character 
distinct from its constituent class members, in the same fashion as we 
assign a legal persona to a corporation distinct from its individual 
shareholders.6  The second advance, following on central insights of both 
private and public law, is to consider the governance structure of legally 
created entities as a distinct problem drawing on basic concepts of 
democratic theory and representation by agents.7 
Isolating the governance issue puts to the side the questions of why there 
need be aggregative structures.  Regardless of whether the justification is 
the negative value of most individual consumer claims, the judicial 
efficiencies of common discovery, the indivisibility of claims for injunctive 
relief, or the distribution of a limited corpus, the question of who is in 
charge remains.  When isolated as a question of who should govern, a 
central concern in the class action case law comes into clearer resolution.  
Separated from the justification for aggregate treatment, there are questions 
of how the ruling group is selected, what the accountability mechanisms 
toward the class members are, what the measures of proper performance in 
office are, and what normative justification there is for that ability to make 
decisions for an individual with whom there is no direct bond or agreement. 
The modern class action cannot claim significant affirmative acts by class 
members indicating their acceptance of the terms of representation.8  There 
is no telling act by class members that would look like the realized buy-in 
of the capital markets,9 or any other mechanism that would allow a clear 
signal of consent to representation.  Instead, class action law has to look for 
substitutes for the legally constructed rights of representation. 
 
 6. David L. Shapiro, Class Actions:  The Class As Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 913, 917 (1998).  For an overview of the role of this approach in the literature on class 
actions, see Alexandra D. Lahav, Two Views of the Class Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939 
(2011). 
 7. Among the foundational pieces in this approach would be Samuel Issacharoff, 
Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337. 
 8. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812–13 (1985) (describing the 
limited requirements for class membership and the limited means of participation). 
 9. John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance:  Taking Accountability Seriously, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 296 (2010) (“In the corporate governance context, an entrepreneur 
seeking to raise capital for a business venture must convince investors to opt in and buy the 
securities of the entrepreneur’s start-up corporation.”). 
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Once so framed, the governance issues in class action law begin to 
resemble many of the central debates in political theory concerning the 
legitimacy of the ruling authority of the state.  The comparison is 
necessarily partial, but the thrust of this Article is to map some of the 
critical questions of the appointment of class counsel onto broader debates 
about political leadership.  Simply put, the focus is on who should be the 
head of the class. 
To flesh out the analogy to governance problems a bit, we may consider 
a class action (and to a lesser degree the powers of the multidistrict 
litigation (MDL) leadership group) as a state-conferred monopoly of 
representation.  Viewed this way, the certification decision serves as a state-
conferred subsidy to the representatives to overcome the collective action 
costs of assembling the group.10  As with any state-conferred monopoly of 
representation, there are immediate concerns about the democratic pedigree 
of the institution.  This is an issue that has dominated areas of law where 
the institutions created by the state have longer life, as with trade unions or 
corporations.  In each, the duty of fair representation and the principles of 
corporate governance are dominant parts of the law.11  Each is an attempt to 
establish principles of accountability to the represented parties (union 
members and shareholders) that combine rights guarantees (e.g., union 
members’ bill of rights), periodic review of managerial performance 
(corporate elections, Department of Labor supervision of union elections), 
and strong assertions of fiduciary obligations.  These in turn combine with 
liability for breach of the fiduciary role (e.g., union duty of fair 
representation, shareholder derivative suits, securities fraud liability).  
Taken together, corporate and trade union accountability mechanisms try to 
reproduce in these secondary sectors the characteristics of democratic 
accountability in the primary governance structure of the state.  There are 
all sorts of arguments on whether some sort of Tieboutian12 sorting is more 
available through market exit options in the corporate setting or through 
labor mobility in the union setting.  But at each stage we find an attempt to 
recreate aspects of the basic governance paradigm. 
 
 10. This view of class actions is well presented in Judith Resnik, Money Matters:  
Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in 
Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2127–29 (2000). 
 11. See generally Archibald Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151 
(1957) (presenting a history of the duties of trade union leaders); see also Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (describing the fiduciary duties of corporate directors). 
 12. The Tiebout model finds that, given exit mechanisms and complete information, 
individuals’ movements between local governments will establish an equilibrium in which 
each government’s size and provision of goods and services accurately reflects the aggregate 
preferences of its residents. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. 
POL. ECON. 416 (1956); see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory 
Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 691 & n.29 (1984) (applying 
the Tiebout model to corporate governance law); Charles K. Rowley, Toward a Political 
Economy of British Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1135, 1149 (1984) (applying the Tiebout 
model to trade unions). 
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I.  GOVERNANCE OUTSIDE POLITICS 
There are no recognizable ordinary politics in the domain of class 
actions.  We do not find elections, political parties, limited terms of office, 
formalized governance mechanisms, or an overriding constitutional 
commitment to certain forms of liberty and equality, and the list goes on.  
This alone seems fatal for any attempt to import elements of democratic 
governance into contemporary mass litigation practice.  It is of course true 
that any aggregation of individuals raises questions of representative 
integrity that in turn raise questions of institutional design that sound in 
democratic principles.  But the answers that suffice for democratic politics 
do not easily translate to the litigation setting.  In the more confined context 
of litigation, there are no political parties, no clear rules of candidacy, and 
no preexisting practices honed over generations of leadership selection.  
And yet, it is worth pursuing what elements of democratic integrity can—
and cannot—be integrated into class action debates. 
A.  The Single Term 
In the world of game theory, the key to stable results is repeat play.  
Robert Axelrod’s famous examination of retaliation instructs that the 
limited response of “tit-for-tat” is only possible among adversaries for 
whom the ability to measure the proportionality of the reaction offers an 
institutional barrier to devastating escalation.13  In democratic politics, the 
corollary is the iteration offered by elections14:  the chance for the losers of 
today to become the winners of tomorrow.  For democratic theorists such as 
Adam Pzreworski and his collaborators, the very concept of a democracy is 
unthinkable until a second election in which the ruling elite is displaced by 
rivals.15  Nothing so defines a true democracy as the ability to “throw the 
rascals out.”16  In turn, the hallmark of the governmental legitimacy of a 
democratic government comes from the fact that the voting citizens 
 
 13. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27–54 (1984).  
 14. This is the heart of the idea that republican governance is “administered by persons 
holding their offices during pleasure for a limited period, or during good behavior.” THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 255 (J. Madison) (Issac Kramnick ed., 1987).  For example, one 
standard account of democratic legitimacy centers on “public policies are made, on a 
majority basis, by representatives subject to effective popular control at periodic elections 
which are conducted on the principle of political equality and under [general] conditions of 
political freedom.” Jesse Choper, The Supreme Court and the Democratic Branches:  
Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 810, 811 (1974) (alteration in original) 
(quoting H. MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 70 (1960)). 
 15. ADAM PRZEWORSKI, MICHAEL E. ALVAREZ, JOSE ANTONIO CHEIBUB & FERNANDO 
LIMONGI, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT:  POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND WELL-BEING IN 
THE WORLD, 1950–1990, at 18–25 (2000). 
 16. The formulation that this is the nub of democracy is from G. BINGHAM POWELL JR., 
ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY:  MAJORITARIAN AND PROPORTIONAL VISIONS 
47 (2000).  The underlying view holds that “the primary function of the electorate” in a 
democracy is not only creating “a government (directly or through an intermediate body)” 
but also “evicting it.” JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 272 
(2d ed. 1975). 
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returned it to office, a retrospective act of approbation.  Without such an 
after-the-fact ability to rethink leadership, it is hard to legitimate the right to 
exercise power over and make binding decisions on others. 
The central role of retrospective review in democratic theory poses an 
immediate dilemma for the legitimacy of a governance structure in one-shot 
enterprises, such as the creation of a class to litigate a defined event.  Only 
the rarest of cases will have such lasting power as to revisit the selected 
leadership, and even those cases cannot be identified at the outset nor 
subjected to meaningful periodic review.  To the extent that accountability 
theories of governmental legitimacy turn on the second chance to reject the 
leadership, such an approach would pose daunting problems for the claims 
of class actions to assign leadership responsibility to those dubbed 
“adequate representatives.”17 
A review of class action law and rules reforms over the past twenty years, 
however, gives a mildly more optimistic account.  To understand why, it is 
necessary to step back a bit into democratic theory.  The idea of 
accountability as the centerpiece of democratic legitimacy was strongly 
advanced by Joseph Schumpeter who rejected any claim that the fate of 
democracy turned on either the aggregation of preexisting voter preferences 
or the participatory deliberation of the populace.  Rather, representative 
democracy necessarily entailed a competition for office by political elites, 
who would in turn educate, cajole, and entice the citizens to vote for them.  
As Schumpeter defined the task, “the democratic method is that institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire 
the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s 
vote.”18 
Thus, the problem of class governance can be thought of as one of 
democratic legitimacy in the absence of a robust capacity for retrospective 
endorsement of the decisions taken by the agent elites, as in mature political 
democracies.  On some accounts, like Martin Redish’s,19 this simply dooms 
the enterprise and violates the due process requirements of constitutional 
legitimacy—an overly simplistic account of due process, political 
legitimacy, and the myriad institutional arrangements that exist in the 
modern administrative state.  Yet the challenge persists.  By what theory of 
governance-based legitimacy can the modern class action be justified?20 
 
 17. See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 
371, 379–81 (2001) (highlighting the role of adequacy of representation in leading Supreme 
Court cases on mass harm class actions). 
 18. SCHUMPETER, supra note 16, at 269. 
 19. See generally MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE:  CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009).  For a rejoinder 
focusing on the nuanced forms of accountability found in democratic governance, see 
Alexandra H. Lahav, Are Class Actions Unconstitutional?, 109 MICH. L. REV. 993 (2011). 
 20. This argument can be extended as well to the domain of the leadership of the 
plaintiffs’ steering committee in multidistrict litigation proceedings. See Charles Silver & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi–Class Action Method of Managing Multi-district Litigations:  
Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107 (2010).  For present purposes, it is 
sufficient to focus primarily on the formal mechanisms of class actions. 
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We can return to the basic insight about political competition in 
democracy.  While most attention is rightfully directed toward the 
importance of competition in creating the capacity for rotation in office, that 
competition not only ensured accountability but gave an incentive to 
political elites to draw the citizens into the process.  The Schumpetarian 
account of democracy shares more than a passing resemblance to the 
negative value claims amassed in class actions, and to the ensuing “rational 
apathy” of the ordinary participants to expend huge effort to monitor 
developments.21  Here, per Schumpeter, there is no escaping the brute fact 
that “collectives act almost exclusively by accepting leadership.”22  But 
competition produces an antidote to the fact that the masses of the 
population typically have little interest in the day-to-day affairs of 
governance.  Information is costly and a distraction from overly busy lives.  
What keeps democracy going is the need of the engaged elites to attempt to 
secure ongoing support in periodic elections.  They must compete for the 
approbation of the masses, and to do so requires them to educate, cajole, 
engage, etc., in the rough and tumble of politics—the pull, trade, and haul 
to which even the Supreme Court has appealed.23  
Retrospective approval serves not only to engage the masses of 
democratic voters but also to provide the easy organizing principle for 
assessing the stewardship of elites.  When the question is asked about the 
effectiveness of the prior governors seeking to renew their mandate (e.g., 
“Are you better off than you were four years ago?”), basic measures—such 
as the state of the economy, foreign military engagements, security, party 
affiliation—can provide easy organizing cues for voter decision making, 
even in the limited period of engagement leading to an election. 
A class action by its nature cannot produce rotation in office.  Perhaps, 
however, it can imperfectly recreate some incentives for leadership to 
engage the absent and generally indifferent class members.  One small 
manifestation comes with the question of the basis for fees for class counsel 
in a settlement.  An older line of cases made the common benefit 
denominator turn on the potentially available benefit to the class.24  Class 
counsel’s responsibility ended with the fairness hearing approval of the 
settlement, with no subsequent requirement that the class’s capacity for 
recovery be engaged.  The sole determinant of the appropriateness of what 
the class leadership had obtained would be the judge’s assessment of the 
result.  Passive class members, whose limited stake made direct control of 
the litigation unavailing, would be left out of the process as much in the 
settlement stage as in the litigation process. 
 
 21. Jack Coffee coined this phrase regarding the little reason that most class members 
had to pay much attention to the activities of class counsel. Coffee, supra note 9, at 305. 
 22. SCHUMPETER, supra note 16, at 270. 
 23. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994). 
 24. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 473 (1980) (“[A] proportionate share 
of the fees awarded to lawyers who represented the successful class may be assessed against 
the unclaimed portion of the fund created by a judgment.”). 
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The lack of responsiveness to the class after settlement led to concern 
over practices such as coupon settlements in which the face value of the 
settlement could vary markedly from the actual results for the class.  At one 
level, this is just a question of agency costs resulting from the separation of 
incentives between lawyers and clients.  This prompted legislative rejection 
of compensating lawyers on the face value of a settlement, regardless of the 
take-up rate of the benefits by class members.  Instead, under the Class 
Action Fairness Act (CAFA), fees must be based on the realized benefits 
for the class.25  Similarly, the corresponding proposal by the American Law 
Institute’s Principles of Aggregate Litigation (ALI Principles) mandates 
that “[a]ttorneys’ fees in class actions . . . should be based on . . . the actual 
value of the judgment or settlement to the class . . . .”26 
As a first-cut matter of governmental legitimacy, the need to engage 
constituents in order for representative agents to get paid is a fairly poor 
second-order approximation of democratic engagement.  This should raise 
alarm about the attempt to justify class action supervision in any terms 
sounding in democratic theory.  But it also offers an invitation to buttress 
this partial (perhaps very partial) defense with other indicators of properly 
functioning representative governance. 
B.  Voice and the Epistemic Moment 
A long tradition in collective governance posits that the wisdom of the 
multitude supercedes the capacity of lone decision makers.  Whether 
dressed up as modern Condorcetian theories, drawn from Aristotle,27 or 
more popularly as the wisdom of crowds,28 many heads lead to truth with 
surprising regularity.  The desire to harness collective wisdom underlies 
participatory theories of democracy and their justification in theories of 
epistemic proceduralism.29 
As with retrospective judgments, there is no clear approximation in class 
action law for the capacity of political communities to deliberate, either 
directly in the Athenian or New England town meeting sense, or indirectly 
through ongoing debate in a Senate-style institution.  There are early 
indications of attempts to harness new media to allow greater participatory 
deliberation in the class action arena.30  But in the typical consumer class 
 
 25. See Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711–1715 (2006). 
 26. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW:  AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.13 (2010). 
 27. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS AND POETICS 74 (Benjamin Jowett & Thomas Twining 
trans., Viking Press 1957) (“The principle that the multitude ought to be supreme rather than 
the few best is one that is maintained, and, though not free from difficulty, yet seems to 
contain an element of truth.”). 
 28. JAMES SUROWEICKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 11 (2004). 
 29. See David M. Estlund, Who’s Afraid of Deliberative Democracy?  On the 
Strategic/Deliberative Dichotomy in Recent Constitutional Jurisprudence, 71 TEX. L. REV. 
1437 (1993). 
 30. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Group Consensus, Individual Consent, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 506, 509 (2011) (“[P]rocess should foster opportunities for plaintiffs in the 
aggregate to form groups and to play a significant role in group governance [by] allowing 
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action or in any case where rational indifference is likely to take hold, the 
direct mechanisms of participatory engagement are not soon to be realized. 
Viewed as an opportunity for deliberative engagement, some aspects of 
class action practice emerge as helping to fill the governance legitimacy 
gap.  The laundry list factors employed by every circuit court to gauge the 
propriety of a class action settlement invariably point centrally to the 
approval of class representatives and class members in the results of the 
litigation.31  The two key avenues of participation are the fairness hearing 
and the right of appeal, as liberalized in Devlin v. Scardelletti.32  The 
Federal Rules require a public hearing, open to class members, for any 
proposal to settle a class action—the overwhelming form of resolution of 
any case in which a class is certified.  The same conditions of incentivized 
indifference may obtain, but at least there is a public forum in which 
dissident views may be engaged.  Similarly, appeals provide a secondary 
forum for dissident voices.  Although there are reasons to suspect that the 
effectiveness of such voices may be limited, courts nonetheless insist that at 
least the opportunity to be heard serves as a touchstone for representational 
legitimacy:  “The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the 
opportunity to be heard.”33 
In practice, the power to object at a fairness hearing and the liberalized 
ability to appeal are poor mechanisms for actual class member 
engagement.34  Most often, they are an opportunity for either strategic 
objectors or the socially marginalized to command a forum for ulterior 
purposes.  These practices are ill-suited to any epistemic search for superior 
outcomes, but they provide a minor democratic moment for constituent 
input.  At the very least, they are a means of providing an additional 
capacity to monitor agents in the class setting,35 and they do provide a very 
 
plaintiffs to engineer and implement their own intraclaimant governance procedures . . . .”); 
Jack B. Weinstein, The Democratization of Mass Actions in the Internet Age, 45 COLUM. J.L. 
& SOC. PROBS. 451, 455 (2012). 
 31. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974) (listing factor 
number two, “the reaction of the class to the settlement”); see also Reed v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 703 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1983) (listing factor number six, “the opinions of the class 
counsel, class representatives, and absent class members”); In re Am. Bank Note 
Holographics, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 418, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“It is well settled that the 
reaction of the class to the settlement is perhaps the most significant factor to be weighed in 
considering its adequacy.” (citation omitted)). 
 32. 536 U.S. 1 (2002). 
 33. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (quoting Grannis v. 
Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)). 
 34. Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence:  Collective Action Problems and 
Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 73 (2007) (“For individual class members, 
objecting does not appear to be cost-beneficial. Objecting entails costs, and the stakes for 
individual class members are often low.  Indeed, objecting is unlikely to confer any benefit 
on class members because judges routinely approve proposed settlements over the objections 
of class members.”). 
 35. Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. 
REV. 571, 573 (1997) (“[A] class member must be allowed to intervene as a full party in a 
proceeding that will extinguish her claim. Affording class members such a right of 
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rough calculus of the consent of the absent and generally passive class 
members to the results of representation.36  But as with any collective 
undertaking, the mere fact that there are some objections can neither doom 
the enterprise nor prevent the class resolution from being deemed 
legitimate.37 
Notably, however, the right of participation is directed not at the 
collective process of group decision making but at the court, the arbiter of 
outcomes more than process as such.  Whereas democratic theory pays 
tremendous attention to electoral rules and the process for collective action 
in the political arena,38 the elaborate processes of political organization and 
reorganization cannot exist in the more limited litigation enterprise.  
Democratic legitimacy turns heavily on process values, something that is 
only partially available as a defense of the class action.  As a result, the 
participatory aim in class actions is directed heavily to the mandating judge, 
a figure who neither is the product of democratic selection among the 
litigants nor can be replaced at the will of the constituents.  Voice in the 
class action setting is first and foremost about the merits of the results.  In 
the somewhat circular reasoning of the Eighth Circuit:  “The adequacy of 
class representation, however, is ultimately determined by the settlement 
itself.”39 
In the formal tests for approval of class action settlements, for example, 
the right of participation is invariably coupled with the ultimate benefits 
achieved through the resolution of the case.40  Courts have recognized that 
the closure afforded by class settlements results in a “peace premium,” 
 
intervention will not render class litigation unmanageable, but rather has the potential to 
significantly improve the quality of representation afforded even to absent class members.”). 
 36. Mark C. Weber, A Consent-Based Approach to Class Action Settlement:  Improving 
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155, 1193 (1998) (arguing for more 
robust provisions for individual consent to class action settlement). 
 37. Issacharoff, supra note 7, at 370 (“[I]t cannot be that the failure of individual consent 
must terminate a class action or prevent a settlement from being approved.  Such an 
approach would run counter to the premise of a class action as being able to discipline an 
inherently unruly body that is incapable of generating sufficient individual protections 
through consensual means.”). 
 38. This is also discussed at length in another work dealing with the political arena 
proper. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics As Markets:  Partisan Lockups 
of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998). 
 39. White v. Nat’l Football League, 41 F.3d 402, 408 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 40. In re Prudential Ins. Co Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 323 
(3d Cir. 1998) (factors include the existence and probable outcome of claims by other classes 
and subclasses and the comparison between the results achieved by the settlement for 
individual class or subclass members and the results achieved—or likely to be achieved—for 
other claimants); Reed v. Gen. Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1983) (listing 
factors number four, “the probability of plaintiffs’ success on the merits”; and five, “the 
range of possible recovery”); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 
1974) (listing factors number eight, “the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in 
light of the best possible recovery”; and nine, the range of reasonableness of the settlement 
fund to a possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation). 
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improving the collective welfare compared to what individuals might obtain 
on their own behalf.41 
As with the other efforts to map class leadership onto principles of 
political legitimacy, the claim to rest the propriety of representation on 
added value of the underlying legal claims is partial, at best.  All forms of 
government ultimately rest on the ability to return benefits to the governed.  
Theories of democratic legitimacy generally leave the ultimate outcome 
measures to the citizens themselves to judge through the exercise of their 
collective decision making.  The lack of individual ability or interest to 
control class members’ individual destiny—as reflected in Rule 
23(b)(3)(A)—forces class action law to turn to a non–process based 
assessment of the merits of the resolution in its place.  As with the other 
approximations of democratic legitimacy in the class context, the forced 
melding of the process values with the assessment of the benefits of the 
collective undertaking weakens each strand—inevitable as this fusion of the 
two might be. 
C.  The Right To Exit 
Democracy is ultimately a selection procedure for governance of the 
polity.  Perhaps as a result, democratic theory poorly addresses the question 
of who should be in the polity, or who belongs outside.  We can fill in the 
gaps with concepts of Tieboutian sorting at the local level.  Thus, for 
example, Charles Tilly posits that the ease of migration between European 
states proved to be an antidote to government predation over the long 
term.42  But while individuals may exit on occasion, there is no guaranteed 
right of secession that serves as a formal check to the exercise of state 
authority.  Democracies cannot offer a unilateral right of exit in the form of 
secession.  Thus, when confronted with the question whether democratic 
legal orders mandate that Quebec be given the right to secede, the Canadian 
Supreme Court wrote: 
The Court in this Reference is required to consider whether Quebec has a 
right to unilateral secession.  Arguments in support of the existence of 
such a right were primarily based on the principle of democracy.  
Democracy, however, means more than simple majority rule . . . .  The 
Constitution vouchsafes order and stability, and accordingly secession of 
a province “under the Constitution” could not be achieved unilaterally, 
that is, without principled negotiation with other participants in 
Confederation within the existing constitutional framework.43 
 
 41. See Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J., 
concurring) (“A defendant, therefore, may be motivated to pay class members a premium 
and achieve a global settlement in order to avoid additional lawsuits . . . .”); Rave, supra note 
5 (manuscript at 9–10). 
 42. See generally CHARLES TILLY, COERCION, CAPITAL, AND EUROPEAN STATES, AD 
990–1990 (1990). 
 43. In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 220 (Can.). 
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Or, more pithily, “[i]nternational law contains neither a right of unilateral 
secession nor the explicit denial of such a right . . . .”44 
In order for a democratic state to function, it must be capable of 
intertemporal trade-offs.  Just as political rotation in office offers the losers 
of today the prospects of becoming part of a victorious coalition tomorrow, 
so too does the long-term allow for the exercise of governmental powers.  
The ability to tax and spend means that there is a constant readjustment of 
the burdens and benefits of inclusion within the state.  But without the 
promise of the long run improvement, no sectors of the society would 
accept a tax burden that predictably benefits distant projects or responds to 
nonlocal emergencies.  And, while the benefits of being locked in to this 
exchange remain, so does the problem of how to construct the polity.45 
By contrast, class action law guarantees not just voice, but the right of 
exit—following Hirschman’s typology for individuals within institutions.  
Indeed such an exit option stands as a centerpiece of the ability to bind 
absent parties in personam to the results of a class judgment:  “due process 
requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with an 
opportunity to remove himself from the class by executing and returning an 
‘opt out’ or ‘request for exclusion’ form to the court.”46  In this sense, class 
action law seems more solicitous of an individual option than does 
democratic society more broadly.  Indeed, the offer of a second option to 
opt out of a class action from the 2003 amendments to Rule 23, endorsed 
heartily by the ALI Principles, reinforces the importance of the exit option 
in constructing the class action collective.47 
The contrast with political leadership is instructive.  To return to 
Hirschman’s typologies of the relation between the individual and the 
group, the importance of the exit option exists in relation with the other 
forms of addressing agency cost in representative groups.  Even accepting 
that there are forms of Tieboutian sorting evident in residential patterns, the 
costs of relocation include loss of community, separation from family and 
friends, and other institutional affiliations through churches or civil society 
organizations.  At the same time, class actions typically do not have a 
preexisting organizational form, and the exit option is far less costly. 
Exit is a weak but real form of disciplining the agency risk inherent in 
class representation.  In the first instance, exit diminishes the rewards from 
representation, especially for class counsel.48 More significantly, the 
 
 44. Id. at 277. 
 45. This problem is elaborated in Samuel Issacharoff, Democracy and Collective 
Decisionmaking, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 231 (2008). 
 46. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). 
 47. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW:  AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.11 (2010). 
 48. Coffee, supra note 9, at 309 (arguing that “exit may be the more powerful tool in 
litigation governance . . . .  In the litigation context, when class members opt out, they 
thereby reduce the total number of claims aggregated in the class action and hence the 
settlement value of the case.  Because fee awards are a function of settlement size, this in 
turn reduces the likely fee award to class counsel.”). But see Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey 
Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation:  Theoretical and 
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exercise of the exit option through significant opt outs signals to reviewing 
courts the poor performance of the class representatives,49 even if the 
overall absence of massive opt outs should dictate some caution in relying 
too much on this one factor.50 
D.  Intermediaries 
In contrast to democratic theory, once again, class action law turns to 
outside intervention to check the powers of representation.  There is no 
ultimate measure of approbation from the represented that can form a 
purely consensual basis for the delegation of power.  The fact that the 
ultimate form of selection is left to the power of another—in this case, the 
court—means that process-based accounts of representational selection 
must necessarily be incomplete.  This inescapable “democracy deficit” is 
only partially cured by the power to exit.  Somehow this gap needs filling 
and the primary mechanism to fill the gap is to search for agents to monitor 
the representative agents, in effect “superagents.”51  Three strategies 
emerge. 
First, class actions only come into existence by the judicial act of 
certification.  Because the courts formalize the representational relationship, 
it is possible to impose on the courts themselves a duty to serve as 
fiduciaries for the act of bringing the class into being.52  Class actions 
routinely, though loosely, invoke the concept of fiduciary obligations to 
describe the role of class counsel and the courts in addressing the 
vulnerabilities of absent class members to predation.53  Because class 
actions are state-created relations designed to protect the welfare of the 
class members, there is logic to bringing them within the broad ambit of the 
law of fiduciary obligations.54  In its most prominent judicial exposition, 
 
Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1560 (2004) (noting the low rate of objection in 
class action litigation, suggesting that “class members do not highly value these rights that 
courts and commentators have so widely praised as essential to the justification for group 
litigation involving absent parties.”). 
 49. See id. at 1536 (“If bad representation triggers opt-outs and objections, counsel will 
make an effort to provide good representation ex ante in order to prevent their deficiencies 
from being brought to the attention of the court ex post.”). 
 50. See id. at 1562 (“The low level of opt-outs and objections also suggests that these 
procedures do not provide a reliable means for ensuring that class members receive adequate 
representation from competent and nonconflicted counsel and class representatives.”).  
 51. This term was first used in Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing 
Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627 (1999). 
 52. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 
785 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 53. Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate Litigation, 
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 997–98 (2012). 
 54. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1649, 1707–08 (2008); Eran B. Taussig, Broadening the Scope of Judicial 
Gatekeeping:  Adopting the Good Faith Doctrine in Class Action Proceedings, 83 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 1275, 1330–33 (2009); Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory 
of Shareholder Representative Suits and Its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 
106 NW. U. L. REV. 1753, 1768 (2012); Chris Brummer, Note, Sharpening the Sword:  Class 
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Judge Posner asserted quite categorically that a court must serve as “a 
fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to the high duty of care that 
the law requires of fiduciaries.”55  In turn, the idea of courts serving as 
fiduciaries underlies arguments for the importance of collateral challenge in 
class settlements.56 
The concept of courts as fiduciaries in group litigation follows from the 
essence of aggregated claims, in any form.  The greater the aggregation, the 
more tenuous the link between principal and agent, and the greater the 
potential for opportunistic behavior and the associated agency costs.  Of 
recent vintage is the effort to impose this duty beyond the formal act of 
class certification.  As articulated by Judge Jack Weinstein in developing 
the concept of the fiduciary obligations of courts in the so-named “quasi–
class actions”: 
The large number of plaintiffs subject to the same settlement matrix 
approved by the court, the utilization of special masters appointed by the 
court to control discovery and to assist in reaching and administering a 
settlement, the court’s order approving and controlling a huge escrow 
fund, other interventions by the court in controlling discovery for all 
claimants, the employment of a multidistrict reference, and cooperation 
among many federal and state courts, reflect a degree of court control that 
supports the imposition of fiduciary standards to ensure fair treatment to 
all parties and counsel . . . .57 
The same logic yields to the imposition of mandatory duties to protect “the 
rights and dignity of an otherwise depersonalized mass of 
plaintiffs/claimants.”58  While the effectiveness of such broad fiduciary 
principles is subject to ongoing debate,59 the need to fill the agency void is 
well established. 
 
Certification, Appellate Review, and the Role of the Fiduciary Judge in Class Action 
Lawsuits, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1042, 1062–67 (2004) (detailing the elements of judicial 
fiduciary scrutiny). 
 55. Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations 
omitted); see also In re Gen. Motors Corp., 55 F.3d at 805 (noting the “fiduciary 
responsibility” of the court in class-settlement review). 
 56. See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against 
Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148 (1998); Alan B. Morrison, The 
Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions:  A Brief Reply to Professors Kahan 
and Silberman, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1179 (1998).  For the original article, see Marcel Kahan & 
Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions:  A Critique of 
Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 782 (1998) (“[T]he collateral attack remedy 
created by Matsushita II is disproportional to the more general problem absent class 
members face in monitoring the conduct of class counsel. The problem, in our view, is best 
addressed by a careful review of the adequacy of representation in [the original forum], 
before a settlement is approved.”). 
 57. In re Zyprexa, 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also In re Vioxx 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 563–64 (E.D. La. 2009); In re Guidant Corp. 
Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *6 
(D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008). 
 58. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Essentials of Democratic Mass Litigation, 45 COLUM. J.L. 
& SOC. PROBS. 499, 521 (2012). 
 59. See generally Silver & Miller, supra note 20. 
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Second, it is possible to deputize outsiders to the litigation to serve as 
overseers.60  This is the approach taken, in part, by CAFA, which sought to 
alter the incentives facing lawyers in large, aggregated cases across a 
variety of axes.61  Among CAFA’s innovations was a requirement of notice 
to the state attorneys general of consumer class actions involving citizens of 
their respective states.62  At least in theory, engaging the public 
representatives to monitor the conduct of the private attorneys general may 
discipline the misbehavior of the self-nominated guardians of class 
interests, at least in highly visible or particularly egregious instances. 
A third approach is to formalize the role of a powerful intermediary with 
a sufficient incentive to monitor the real agent in all representative 
actions—class counsel.  The leading example is the formalization of the 
lead plaintiff role under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995.  Under the “most adequate plaintiff” requirement, the forum court 
“shall appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members of the purported 
plaintiff class that the court determines to be most capable of adequately 
representing the interests of class members.”63 As envisioned, the lead 
plaintiff’s self-interest is sufficiently great as to allow other class members 
a free-ride on the ensuing monitoring function:   
The lead plaintiff provision was adopted to encourage a class member 
with a large financial stake to become the class representative.  Congress 
expected that such a plaintiff would actively monitor the conduct of a 
securities fraud class action so as to reduce the litigation agency costs that 
may arise when class counsel’s interests diverge from those of the 
shareholder class.64 
All three of these approaches may be beneficial in certain contexts, or 
may be an invitation to meddling by yet other sets of agents with other 
agendas.  Each of these approaches faces difficulties born of improperly 
aligned incentives:  judges may wish to clear their dockets; attorneys 
 
 60. Kahan & Silberman, supra note 56, at 778 (“One way to reduce undervaluation of 
class members’ claims would be to strengthen the ‘monitoring’ of class counsel by obtaining 
more effective monitors than ordinary class members, such as state attorneys general, who 
would be given notice and have the authority to intervene in order to protect the interests of 
absent class members in nationwide class actions.”). 
 61. Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
1593, 1606–26 (2008) (discussing CAFA). 
 62. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b) (2006).  For an overview of the limited effectiveness of this 
monitoring device, see generally Catherine M. Sharkey, CAFA Settlement Notice Provision:  
Optimal Regulatory Policy?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1971 (2008). 
 63. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(i) (2006). 
 64. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical 
Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1688 
(2006); see also id. at 1601 (“Such a heavy hitter is more likely to overcome the personal 
interests of class counsel who may prefer the certainty of settling the suit quickly for a 
smaller amount to investing more of the law firm’s resources in pursuing a larger settlement 
that does not yield a proportional increase in counsel fees.”). But see Jill E. Fisch, Class 
Action Reform:  Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 534 (1997) 
(questioning “the ability of a lead plaintiff provision or other similar procedural reforms to 
effect a meaningful change in the control of class action litigation”). 
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general may be passive or may see the rewards of a class action settlement 
as an opportunity for political gain; lead plaintiffs may seek different 
returns on their investment than smaller players.65  Ultimately, one should 
be cautious of inviting class members to stake their interests on the strategy 
outlined by Blanche DuBois:  “I have always depended on the kindness of 
strangers.”66 
E.  Rivals for Leadership 
The attempts to find greater and more actionable fiduciary duties bear a 
marked resemblance to a corresponding trend in corporate law to close the 
agency gap through fiduciary obligations.  Entire generations of students of 
corporate law were groomed on the decisions of the Delaware courts 
defining the obligations of officers and directors of publicly traded 
corporations to the diffuse and atomized shareholders—the class members 
of the limited liability enterprise as it were.  Beginning with trends in 
scholarship and case law in the 1980s, however, corporate law turned to a 
new source of restraint on potential agency costs.  As with any market in 
which built-in barriers to entry allow misconduct, one potential antidote is 
renewed competition.  In corporate law this takes the form of challenging 
poison pills and other barriers to a market for corporate control.  
Unsurprisingly, a similar impulse can be found in the market for class 
action governance.67 
One market import is the effort to auction the rights to class action 
leadership, presumably to the lowest bidder in terms of class counsel fees.68  
The arguments over the application of auction principles have been 
rehearsed at length and need not be repeated here.  There are problems in 
measuring the low bid and the return to the class when higher priced 
counsel might deliver a higher quality return69—even at a higher 
percentage—and when a low bid might actually signal lawyers with little 
 
 65. Fisch, supra note 64, at 556–57. 
 66. TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, A STREETCAR NAMED DESIRE 142 (SIGNET 1975) (1947). 
 67. Coffee, supra note 9, at 318 (arguing that participatory reforms “have less impact 
than anticipated because they fail to encourage competition among counsel”).  
 68. Judge Vaughn Walker introduced the auction as a means of selecting class counsel 
in In re Oracle Secs. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 697 (N.D. Cal. 1990).  The initial academic 
proposal comes from Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s 
Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:  Economic Analysis and Recommendations 
for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 105–16 (1991).  For a summary of these efforts to reform 
class counsel selection, see Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block:  Evaluating the 
Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650 (2002); Rhonda 
Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 497 (2000). 
 69. A prominent example comes with the bidding for leadership in the Auction House 
antitrust litigation. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); 
see also DAVID BOIES, COURTING JUSTICE 320–54 (2004) (discussing the litigation over 
price-fixing by the major auction houses).  For a critical account of this litigation, see Alon 
Harel & Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty:  Selection and Monitoring of Class Counsel, 
22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 69 (2004). 
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interest in investing in the litigation and preferring a quick, cheap 
settlement that maximizes short-term recovery of counsel. 
Unfortunately, consideration of competition for leadership returns us to 
the initial problem of a lack of repeat play.  Without repeat play, and 
without a clearly identifiable system of valuation, the attempt to use price 
and other proxies for performance are inherently limited.  Politics allows 
the governed to select not only who their leaders shall be, but the criteria for 
such decision making.  Competition for the role of class counsel still leaves 
the decision to an outside party and to one who is obligated to determine the 
conditions of the competition for leadership. 
II.  AGENTS WITHOUT AGENCY COSTS? 
The basic analogy to problems of public governance could be extended 
and could encompass trends in other intermediary institutions of our 
society.  Increasingly, obligations sounding in democratic theory extend not 
only to the quasi-public domain but to more private institutions directly.70  
Public conceptions of democratic legitimacy spread from the imposition of 
nominating primaries on political parties to the chartering requirements for 
charitable institutions.  All intermediary institutions in our society live to 
some extent by grace of state licensing.  This may take the form of tax 
deductions for contributions to charitable organizations, tax exemption for 
the land holdings of religious or educational institutions, or the ability of a 
corporate entity to acquire the legal personhood necessary in order to 
pledge assets as a bond for economic activity or to enter into legally binding 
contracts. 
In all intermediary institutions there is a misfit between democratic 
theory and the exclusivity of the state-conferred capacity to act.  
Intermediary institutions are closed by necessity in order to limit 
participation to those who share the basic aims or activities of the 
enterprise.  This means that they must be able to restrict rights of 
participation to those who are inside and exclude others from internal 
deliberations.  While these institutions exist in some sense by grace of 
recognition and benefits derived from the body politic, they must 
nonetheless function on a different basis than the overall democratic lines of 
demarcation of the broader society.  The paradox of civil society 
institutions in a democracy is that their independence shores up democracy 
as against the state, yet they cannot be held to the full democratic standards 
demanded for political governance.  Civil society institutions function “by 
cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster 
diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual and the power of 
the State.”71 
 
 70. Once again I must confess to drawing on ideas that I developed responding to a 
distinct set of problems in the domain of public governance. See Samuel Issacharoff, Private 
Parties with Public Purposes:  Political Parties, Associational Freedoms, and Partisan 
Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274 (2001). 
 71. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618–19 (1984). 
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Class actions serve functionally as a short-lived, single-purpose civil 
society institution.  In prior writings I have drawn the analogy to the 
Venetian grant of legal status to the commenda, “a rudimentary type of joint 
stock company, which formed only for the duration of a single trading 
mission.”72  As described by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, the 
flexibility of a circumscribed venture unleashed tremendous entrepreneurial 
spirit for the emergent Venetian Republic of the early Renaissance.73  The 
entrepreneurial class action is the enforcement equivalent to the commenda, 
an alternative to direct state regulation and to the state monopoly of 
enforcement power.  The state confers the exclusive legal personhood to the 
class and awards exclusive rights of monopoly of representation granted to 
the designated agents for the entity, in this case, class counsel.  This 
establishes the purpose for the state conferral of the power of class counsel 
to act as agents for the usually passive absent class members. 
But, as the foregoing section described, this new entity fails to meet the 
standards for democratic legitimacy in critical domains, most notably in the 
ability of the represented class members to express meaningfully their 
approval or disapproval through retrospective review.  This alone is not 
surprising as intermediary institutions cannot be held to the full standards 
operating in the public domain.  At the heart of the difficulty is that a 
litigation class is a short-lived institution, so the Schumpeterian 
accountability paradigm does not work.  Further, there are generally 
massive transaction problems with even putatively engaging the 
participants, so that surveying the class, elections, and periodic review are 
all not often meaningfully available.  
A.  Transcending Private Agent Incentives 
Thus far, this Article has suggested that many of the doctrines that have 
emerged in class action law, and in secondary accounts such as the ALI 
approach, are an attempt to fill this gap in democratic accountability.  In the 
absence of a more Schumpetarian account of periodic accountability and a 
robust ability to “throw the bums out,” we can chronicle the institutional 
substitutes that emerge as an effort to bridge this representational gap.  The 
various requirements for class certification try to temper the incentives of 
the agent, who is necessarily imperfect as principal-agent tensions can only 
be tamed, not eliminated.  Moreover, they attempt to create mechanisms of 
outside monitoring (e.g., the judge as fiduciary), examine the justificatory 
necessity for litigation (an increase in anticipated joint welfare), and 
consider the absence of realistic alternatives (the Churchillian defense of 
democracy as worst of all systems except for all others).  Finally, they aim 
to protect some measure of active choice among the represented class 
 
 72. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL:  THE ORIGINS OF 
POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 152 (2012). 
 73. Samuel Issacharoff, Class Actions and State Authority, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 385 
(2012). 
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members (e.g., right to opt out, second opt out), weigh the results obtained 
(akin to the epistemological defense of democracy as likelier to lead to 
superior outcomes), and no doubt attain quite a few other goals.  At best, 
these are all checkpoints for the state conferral of representational authority 
in the absence of a conventional political accountability.  Recognizing this 
helps understand the fits and starts of much of the highly disputed law of 
the past two decades, particularly the post-Amchem/Ortiz focus on the 
nature of the representation as the key to proper class action practice. 
Where does the governance insight lead?  As I mentioned at the outset, 
there is a tension in the case law in this regard because the question of 
legitimate governance is almost always raised strategically.  Challenges to 
the adequacy of representation are usually part of the arsenal deployed by 
defendants to oppose class certification or by objectors seeking either to 
capture some of the compensatory prospects of a class action settlement or 
to be able to pursue claims independently in other fora.  Isolating who 
should be in charge of a class action from the reasons for having a class 
action helps (hopefully) to bring into sharper relief the reasoning behind the 
case law and the evolved practices on class representation. 
Even isolated in this fashion, the issue of the legitimacy of class 
representation returns as part of the general concern for the extent of agency 
cost associated with class counsel.  Beginning with the hugely influential 
writings of Professor Coffee twenty-five years ago,74 and continuing 
through the Court’s decision in Amchem, many of the governance 
mechanisms are directed to the prospect of agents acting in self-regarding 
means.  What follows from this, however, should not be a rejection of the 
need for representative actions altogether, but greater attention to the 
management and diminution of agency cost in class representation. 
With all the pressures on legitimacy of representation come questions 
about the possibility of alternative forms of representation.  The search for 
political legitimacy in class representation, at least in the contemporary 
American class action, runs up directly against the entrepreneurial 
motivation that the class action seeks to harness on behalf of the absent 
class members.  Presumably class counsel selected on the basis of an 
economic commitment to maximize financial returns to the class will be 
especially likely to succumb to the cross-cutting incentives in any principal-
agent relationship. 
Perhaps it is possible to consider a form of representation that does not 
involve these agency costs.  At least in theory, it is possible to imagine that 
class counsel can be selected based on other attributes, such as social 
reputation, ideological commitments to the welfare of some groups, or even 
evidence of saintliness.  Selecting class representatives on this basis may 
 
 74. The articles begin with John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney:  
The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and 
Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986), and John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation 
of Entrepreneurial Litigation:  Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987). 
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substitute for the necessarily imperfect alignment of economic interests in 
the American class action.  Many foreign experiments with class actions try 
to limit the pull of entrepreneurialism by substituting state officials or 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for the self-selection of the private 
attorney general.75 
Some commentators76 posit that it may be possible to avoid the agency 
costs of the American entrepreneurial class actions by having consumer 
organizations or social movements lead opt in groups of claimants.  There 
are limited examples of class action in the United States organized on an 
opt in basis, or more significantly, led by public interest groups committed 
to issues such as civil rights or environmental protection.  While such 
ideologically committed groups are unlikely to be motivated by the 
narrower kinds of financial returns that fuel more entrepreneurial private 
enforcement, representation always introduces a distance between the 
interests of the principals and the decision making of the agents.77  The 
extensive public economy literature on nonprofits finds that there are often 
significant agency costs created not by the profit motive of for-profit 
enterprises, but by the diffuse nature of the missions they seek to achieve 
and the difficulties of monitoring their performance in the absence of 
market-based returns.78  Further, the need for funding often compromises 
the effectiveness of nonprofits to take on controversial issues or lead 
 
 75. For critical assessments, see Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will 
Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179 (2009) (reviewing European 
class action reforms and considering their efforts to promote representative actions without 
private lawyer initiatives); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic 
and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) (reviewing 
European efforts “to embrace civil procedure reforms to authorize aggregate litigation”).  
For a critical account of the development of mass litigation in South America, focusing on 
Argentina, see RICARDO LUIS LORENZETTI, JUSTICIA COLECTIVA (2010). 
 76. A recent significant addition to the literature comes with Coffee, supra note 9, at 
337; see also Tiana Leia Russell, Exporting Class Actions to the European Union, 28 B.U. 
INT'L L.J. 141, 177 (2010) (“Representative actions by associations also offer more 
possibilities to curb principal-agent problems than do other forms of class actions.”); Hans-
Bernd Schaefer, The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation.  The Incentives for Class 
Action and Legal Actions Taken by Associations, 9 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 183, 199–201 (2000) 
(“[C]ompared to class action legal actions taken by associations seem to offer more effective 
possibilities to restrict the principal-agent-problem . . . .”); Sarah A. Westby, Note, 
Associations to the Rescue: Reviving the Consumer Class Action in the United States and 
Italy, 20 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 189 (2011) (“[A]ssociational 
representation decreases agency costs because litigants can be confident that [the] entity has 
their best interests in mind.”). 
 77. Economic theory predicts that the lack of profit incentives will make nonprofits 
slower to expand to meet increased demand and less efficient at using inputs than for-profit 
firms. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 844 (1980). 
 78. See, e.g., Mary Kay Gugerty & Aseem Prakash, Voluntary Regulation of NGOs and 
Nonprofits:  An Introduction to the Club Framework, in VOLUNTARY REGULATION OF NGOS 
AND NONPROFITS:  AN ACCOUNTABILITY CLUB FRAMEWORK 3, 8–13 (Mary K. Gugerty & 
Aseem Prakash ed., 2010) (discussing sources of agency costs in nonprofit sector). 
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beyond where their funders would accept.79  Even in the American public 
interest context, the search for the perfect agents leads to claims of a 
different kind of agency cost defined by the imposition of institutional 
objectives over the interests of the putatively represented parties.80  At 
bottom, there is simply no theoretical or empirical basis to suppose that the 
absence of remuneration to an agent necessarily inures to the benefit of the 
represented parties.81 
Ironically, the very insight that opened the class action to a more 
sophisticated scholarly account of agency costs may also now serve as a set 
of blinders on the range of agency problems in representation.  The 
approach to agency cost suggested by Coffee drew (and still draws) 
exclusively from the securities and corporate governance literature,82 
inviting a comparison of the extent to which the governance mechanisms 
chosen in the private domain could help overcome principal-agent 
problems.  Perhaps this move was inevitable given the sheer weight of 
securities class actions in the post-1966 world of mass litigation.  If 
securities fraud class actions, especially after Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,83 were 
to serve as the primary vehicle of legal oversight of corporate governance—
pushing to the side shareholder derivative suits and other clumsier forms of 
corporate litigation—then the transposition of the terms of corporate 
governance to the securities class action would make perfect sense.  And, 
further, if robust capital markets increasingly set the standards for 
measuring the propriety of actions by corporate managers and directors, 
then the logic of that governance structure should presumably extend to the 
regulatory enterprise of the securities class action. 
For all the insights offered by the securities context of a large proportion 
of class actions, however, the class action shares only partially the 
governance problems of the modern corporation.  It is not simply that 
 
 79. Debra C. Minkoff & Walter W. Powell, Nonprofit Mission:  Constancy, 
Responsiveness, or Deflection?, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR:  A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 591, 
592–93 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2006). 
 80. The classic account comes from Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:  
Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 
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communities over the type of school relief).  For efforts to mediate conflicts in public 
interest representation, see William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate:  Addressing 
Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 
1623 (1997). 
 81. In the class context, several commentators have noted that a public interest 
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other class interests). See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action 
Litigation:  An Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 581, 618; 
Howard M. Erichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2087, 2090–91 (2004). 
 82. It is striking, for example that Coffee’s Litigation Governance, supra note 9, does 
not even mention the social welfare concerns of public choice theory in the public sector.  
By and large, the legal literatures on agency problems in the public sector and in private 
corporate governance developed largely in splendid isolation from each other, despite the 
overlapping set of concerns.  This point is elaborated in Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 38, 
at 643. 
 83. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
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markets in securities bring the shareholders together and, at the same time, 
offer them a chance of exit through the sale of securities.  Rather, it is the 
persistent role of the court as a state actor operating throughout the period 
of existence of the class action that separates it from the business firm.  The 
role of the state in licensing and overseeing invites a comparison to a 
different sort of principal-agent concern:  the public choice account of 
regulatory capture. 
B.  Public Choice in the Public Domain 
Agency costs abound in any system of representation.  The inevitable 
mismatch between the incentive systems operating on the principals and 
their agents gives rise to all sorts of opportunistic behavior by agents 
seeking to exploit the dependence of the principals.  Agency costs are 
particularly acute where the principal is diffuse and unable to monitor 
meaningfully the actions of the agents.  In the key formulation of public 
choice theory, such agency costs are likely to be most acute in the public 
sector where the beneficiaries of obscure regulation can lobby and prevail 
over the indifference of the mass of the cost-bearing public.84  In particular, 
the absence of a market in representation (unlike the markets that always 
operate in the background of private investment matters) means that there is 
no ultimate competitive discipline on public sector decision making, 
particularly in the absence of private alternatives. 
Certainly membership in a class of negative-value claimants yields a 
rational indifference on the part of class members.  The question, however, 
is not whether there are risks of agency cost in the private class action 
organized under American law.  Of course there are.  Rather, the question is 
always, compared to what?  It is odd to read the literature applying agency 
cost theory to the class action ignore the broader concerns of the public 
choice literature about the risks in the public domain.  One reads with some 
bemusement the conclusion of earnest European reformers who insist that 
having government entities or NGOs perform the representation function 
eliminates the principal-agent problem.  In the romantic and naïve claims of 
such reformers, having a monopoly on representation somehow protects 
diffuse class members from any agency cost in representation.  As 
presented in critiques of American class actions, agency cost becomes a 
matter exclusive to the domain of private actors. 
A quick tour of public choice theory should dispel such naïve claims.  
Large, diffuse groups tend to lose to concentrated self-interest and nowhere 
more so than in the public domain—the world conventionally understood to 
be populated with lobbyists, special interests, privileged access, and so 
 
 84. The classic formulation of public choice theory is found in JAMES M. BUCHANAN & 
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:  LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 3–9 (1962); see also DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, 
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE:  A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 21–33 (1991); MAXWELL L. STEARNS 
& TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 42–89 (2009). 
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forth.85  Such agency costs may be present even in the American litigation 
context when public agencies take on enforcement authority on behalf of 
affected groups of citizens, as Margaret Lemos well presents.86 
Just as there are examples of American class actions gone awry and of 
entrepreneurial lawyers crossing the bounds of what the law permits, so too 
there are stories of successes in nonprofit or public agency representation.87  
It would be foolish to claim that there is an exclusive model of 
representation that best fits all claims by groups who do not or cannot bind 
their fates together through voluntary contracts.  Perhaps the most 
interesting of the successes of foreign efforts were the use of NGOs to curb 
rampant corporate fraud during the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s.  
People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), a Korean 
nonprofit founded in 1994, successfully brought shareholder derivative suits 
over corporate malfeasance on behalf of minority shareholders, in effect 
bundling claims to overcome the inability of small shareholders to 
challenge corporate actions.88  Similarly, in 1998, the Taiwanese Securities 
and Futures Commission created a nonprofit, the Securities and Futures 
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in AG actions); Samuel Issacharoff, Group Litigation of Consumer Claims:  Lessons from 
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accountability of public agency litigation). 
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prosecutions and incarcerations of leading class action lawyers to drive home the point about 
high agency costs in private representation. John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and 
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Institute (SFI), to coordinate individual investors in claims against public 
companies.89  SFI was created as a nonprofit funded by mandatory 
payments from banks and brokerage firms, which in turn allowed it to 
acquire 1,000 shares of each public company in Taiwan, giving it standing 
to assert claims as a shareholder.90 
The experience of the PSPD in Korea and the SFI in Taiwan show the 
impact of strongly led nonprofits offering an independent challenge to 
institutional misconduct.  Their successes are all the more striking given the 
propensity of public enforcers to not have the resources or the will to 
confront such malfeasance.  But there is also a cautionary note even here.  
These nonprofits tend not to last or to be unable to create an institutional 
culture that goes beyond the commitment and charisma of its founding 
leaders.  The PSPD’s trailblazing in South Korea faded within five years 
and, once the ownership threshold for initiating legal action was reduced, 
independent shareholder actions began to emerge and the PSPD passed 
from the center stage of reform activity.91 
More typically, however, recent efforts to form class actions without 
private financial incentives have faltered precisely because of the absence 
of entrepreneurial initiative.  For example, Brazil limits class action 
formation to government agencies and “private associations,” which alone 
have standing to serve as class counsel—and even here, the Attorney 
General must be notified and invited to intervene as “overseer.”92  Despite 
the ease of forming such associations, the fact that they must exist for one 
year prior to any legal action means they are unable to form in response to a 
single precipitating event.  As a result, relatively few class actions have 
been filed,93 and most concern professional associations suing on behalf of 
the direct interests of their members.94  The experience is similar in 
Portugal, home of the “popular action,” Europe’s oldest opt-out class action 
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regime, established in 1995.95  Portuguese law allows individuals and 
associations to file class actions to protect numerous interests, and the 
largest of these, the Portuguese Association for Consumer Protection 
(DECO) was founded in 1974 and currently has about 400,000 members, at 
least nominally.96  Between 1995 and 2008, DECO brought a grand total of 
five damages class actions, of which the only one tried to judgment 
involved an opera company.97 
The list of the very limited enforcement successes of the public or NGO 
model of the class actions could go on98 and could be expanded into efforts 
to police capital markets as well—as with the German Capital Markets Case 
Act, a largely useless attempt to create representative litigation without 
class actions or class lawyers.99  The current debates over the expansion of 
class actions, particularly in Latin American countries seeking to break the 
excesses of state authority, are not about the costs of self-motivated 
lawyers.  They are instead about the ability to unleash independent agents 
who will challenge the suffocating potential for capture of exclusive state 
authority.  As well expressed by Ricardo Lorenzetti, the President of the 
Argentine Supreme Court, independent collective actions are critical 
“because they are mechanisms that the rule of law provides so that civil 
society participates,” and they allow the possibility of “fewer centralized 
decisions in a country with a long tradition of centralized 
decisionmaking.”100 
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 100. Ricardo Lorenzetti, La Acción de Clase Es un Aporte al Diseño Institucional del 
País, PORTAL DEL CONSUMIDOR PROTECTORA, http://www.protectora.org.ar/legislacion/la-
accion-de-clase-es-un-aporte-al-diseno-institucional-del-pais/1453/ (last visited Apr. 19, 
2012) (“Las acciones colectivas son un gran aporte al diseño institucional del país porque 
son mecanismos que provee el Estado de Derecho para que la sociedad civil participe. Y si el 
ciudadano común participa en la vida del país, entonces hay más control, más debate, hay 
discusión y transparencia, menos oscilaciones pendulares y más equilibrio de fuerzas, menos 
decisiones centralizadas en un país con una larga tradición de decisiones centralizadas.”). 
 3190 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
A recent analysis of class actions in Chile contains well-researched 
documentation of class acitons without entrepreneurial leadership.  In 2004, 
the Chilean legislature sought to create American style opt-out consumer 
class actions, but without the creation of an entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ 
bar.101  Notably, the Chilean act provided that class counsel is assigned 
after the class certification stage, meaning that attorneys who ferret out 
wrongdoing stand to lose control of the class to a rival attorney representing 
a small number of class members, or to the state consumer protection 
agency SERNAC, which must approve all settlements and has the option to 
assume control of any litigation.102  Combined with the limited range of 
damages, this means that there is little incentive for attorneys to serve the 
role of private attorneys general.  The result was predictably marginal, at 
best.  Few class actions are ever filed in Chile; the peak was eleven in 2007, 
and by 2010, only four were filed.103  SERNAC and independent consumer 
associations are the most frequent class action plaintiffs, but chronic 
funding shortages prevent them from pursuing more than a handful of cases 
at a time—cases that frequently drag out for years due to the lack of 
settlement pressure.104  Class actions financed by small, cohesive groups of 
plaintiffs or by entrepreneurial lawyers are few in number, and the low 
financial stakes mean that class counsel is often relatively 
unsophisticated.105 
To return to the main thesis of this Article, at the end of the day, agency 
costs result from the fact of needing agents.  If our only objective is to 
avoid the risk of the car mechanic recommending needless repairs or the 
dentist overtreating then the easiest solution is to never take our cars to the 
shop and never enter the dentist’s office.  We would thereby successfully 
avoid overpaying, though a world of disabled cars and abscessed mouths 
awaits. 
It is easy to focus on the perceived excesses of American class actions.  
There are no doubt embarrassing cases brought in the zeal for gain, and the 
lawyers do receive on the order of 25 percent of the proceeds.106  Both the 
amount charged and the possible excesses are a form of agency cost that 
requires both justification and regulation.  Less visible, but perhaps more 
pervasive and damaging, are the agency costs foregone because of a lack of 
agents who will undertake the work of principals unable to undertake the 
work themselves.  The short run gain of avoiding the mechanic and the 
dentist is rarely the winning strategy in the long run.  Perhaps, in some 
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alternative set of arrangements, all such considerations could be avoided in 
nonprofit garages and dental cooperatives.  Perhaps. 
CONCLUSION 
It is inevitable in life that we have to rely on others for what we cannot 
do ourselves.  With agency comes costs, a condition that may be managed 
but never cured.  In the public domain, we look to elements of political 
accountability to justify the ability of some to bind others by their actions.  
In the private domain, the best indication of fairness comes with the 
revealed preferences of private exchange.  As society becomes more 
complex, the simpler solutions of town meetings in the public domain and 
one-to-one contracts in the private domain become unwieldy, and a host of 
intermediary institutional arrangement needs to be created. 
Class actions are the product of complex interactions, and they fall 
neither fully within nor without the domain of public regulation or private 
contractual exchange.  As with all such intermediary organizations, there 
needs to be justification for the powers of the governors and for the costs 
that they will inevitably exact for their governance.  The ultimate difficulty 
is that the justification for the class action ultimately lies neither in the 
domain of the democratic legitimacy that we may attach to the state nor to 
the voluntarism that we assign to contracts.  Class actions fall somewhere in 
between and the justifications, largely functional, are cobbled together from 
a host of considerations, some from the public domain and some from the 
private domain. 
Ever since Hansberry v. Lee,107 the Supreme Court has recognized that 
class representatives may not faithfully represent the interests of the absent 
class members.108  The result has been the increasing formalism in class 
action law focusing on the requirements for certification and, in particular, 
on the adequacy of representation.  In recent decisions such as Taylor v. 
Sturgell109 and Smith v. Bayer,110 the Court has demanded that the 
formalities of class certification be honored before any claims of agents to 
bind their principals might be recognized.111  Taken together, these cases 
signal the Court’s tacit recognition that rights of representation are being 
assigned without many of the safeguards that are usually demanded in 
granting legitimacy to governmental authority.  Although the governance 
issue in the case law usually plays out as a formal exercise in following 
Rule 23, there is more at stake.  The Court’s leading cases stand for the 
recognition that attentiveness to procedural rigor is the price paid for 
collective action in the absence of normal political accountability. 
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